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ABSTRACT 
We seek to deepen understanding of the micro-foundations of institutionalization while 
contributing to a sociological theory of markets by investigating the puzzle of price bubbles in 
financial markets. We find that such markets, despite textbook conditions of high efficiency – 
perfect information, atomistic agents, no uncertainty – quickly develop patterns consistent with 
institutionalization processes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last three decades years, the “new” institutional theory rose to prominence, 
becoming a cornerstone on the relationship between organizations and their environment. Its 
tenets – the organizational pursuit of legitimacy and status (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the spread 
of believes, norms and practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983),  and the institutionalization of 
processes and structures into a rule-like status (Zucker, 1977) – have become underlying 
assumptions of organizational theory at large. Institutional theory had wide ranging impact and 
was used to explain a variety of important phenomena including organizational structure, culture, 
change and response to external pressures, adoption of practices, and the impact of institutions 
on individuals in organizations. 
 Institutionalization. The importance of institutionalization, as both a process and a 
property variable, was noted early in the development of the field (Zucker, 1977). However, 
despite the proliferation of institutional theory, the micro-foundations of institutionalization have 
received scant empirical attention: “the experimental social psychological work of Zucker (1977) 
and some of her subsequent work focusing on how context differences lead to multiple social 
orders offer insights into institutional variation at more local levels. This line of research is the 
most underdeveloped in institutional theory” (Lounsbury, 1997:468). Because this line of 
research has seen little development, theory has necessarily resorted to presumptions about the 
mechanisms of institutionalization, leading to a structurally deterministic theory. While recent 
years have seen rise of research on change at the macro level, there is paucity of evidence on the 
origins of institutionalization. Despite Zucker’s assertion that “macro-level and micro-level are 
inextricably intertwined” (1977:728), multi-level assessments remain elusive. Our work here 
builds on earlier efforts to alleviate this paucity by directly examining micro-processes of 
institutionalization. 
Markets. The emergence of the new economic sociology has brought renewed interest in 
markets as a phenomenon that deserves sociological attention (Baker, Faulkner, & Fisher, 1998; 
Levine, Apfelbaum, Bernard, Bartelt, Zajac, & Stark, 2014). Although financial markets, with 
their vast economic and social impact, carry particular importance, the lenses of institutional 
 theory have not been turned to such markets frequently, with few notable exceptions (Abolafia & 
Kilduff, 1988; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003b; Zajac & Westphal, 2004a). 
The micro-foundations of institutionalization in markets remain conjectural to date. We 
seek to deepen and extend Zucker’s original insight on the micro-processes of institutionalization 
while contributing to the sociological understanding of markets, by using a high-efficiency 
financial market as our empirical context. One of the difficulties in treating micro-level action is 
the garnering of fine-grained individual data while observing macro-level outcomes (cf. Lucas & 
Lovaglia, 2006). Hence, in this study we utilize a well-established experimental methodology 
from behavioral economics to observe and measure such micro processes. It also allows us to 
rule out purely individual-level explanations for inefficiency that are steeped in economic 
psychology or behavioral economics. 
THE PUZZLE OF PRICE BUBBLES 
Contemporary economic theory recognizes that markets sometimes develop price 
bubbles, i.e., they exhibit "trade in high volume at prices that are considerably at variance from 
intrinsic value" (King, Smith, Williams, & van Boening, 1993:183). Cases such as the stock 
market crash of 1929 demonstrate the enormous effect of bubbles on individuals, firms, markets 
and even nations, and explain the interest they draw from economists as well as the public. While 
important in their consequences, the causes of bubbles are not well understood and there is no 
widely accepted theory to explain their occurrence. The existence of market bubbles seems at 
odds with common assumptions regarding the efficiency of financial markets. Even more 
puzzling is the finding that bubbles occur not only in real-world markets, with their inherent 
noise and uncertainty, but also in highly predictable experimental markets (Smith, Suchanek, & 
Williams, 1988). As Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith and associates conceded, “controlled 
laboratory markets price bubbles are something of an enigma” (Smith, van Boening, & Wellford, 
2000:568). 
In a typical study, participants engage in trading of assets that are defined to have a finite 
lifespan and a known distribution of dividends. Uncertainty is eliminated and participants should 
be able to calculate the intrinsic value of the assets simply by examining the expected stream of 
dividends. The market epitomizes economic efficiency, because in addition to complete 
information each individual can simultaneously buy and a sell (as common in stock markets). 
Communication is strictly limited to the posting of bid and ask offers, so collusion is unlikely 
and efficient prices should prevail. Nevertheless, price bubbles have been observed repeatedly in 
experimental markets, even with sophisticated participants such as business students, managers, 
and professional traders. Such bubbles have proven robust to a variety of conditions, including 
short-selling, margin buying, equal portfolio endowment, brokerage fees, the presence of 
informed insiders, dividend certainty, constant value, and limit price change rule (King et al., 
1993; Porter & Smith, 2003). 
Bounded rationality. While a complete explanation of experimental bubbles is still in the 
making, some implied that the phenomena is the result of bounded rationality, as it has been 
shown that bubbles abated when participants traded repeatedly within the same group 
(Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, & Moore, 2005; King et al., 1993; van Boening, Williams, & LaMaster, 
1993). It may be argued that bounded rationality gives rise to bubbles in the short term as people 
may have cognitive difficulties in applying a theoretical pricing model. Arguably, initial 
mispricing may be decreasing due to individual learning processes, which lead to improved 
pricing in subsequent periods and an overall abatement of bubbles. 
 Greater Fool explanation. Prevalent among practitioners but present also in the academic 
literature (Smith et al., 1988:1148), the Greater Fool explanation posits that bubbles are fueled 
by speculators who knowingly purchase overpriced assets in the hope that they can later sell 
those assets even more dearly to gullible investors, i.e. “greater fools”. The psychological 
literature provides support through evidence that people tend to be overconfident about their own 
skills (Svenson, 1981).  
Institutionalization. It is also possible that bubbles stem not from psychological or 
otherwise individually-based biases, but from institutionalization in which “correct” 
interpretations of facts and legitimate reactions become taken-for-granted, as was shown in 
previous experiments (Zucker, 1977) and financial markets studies (Abolafia & Kilduff, 1988; 
Levine et al., 2014; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003a; Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 
2004b). Institutionalization can lead to coordinated action through the internalization of beliefs 
and interpretations of facts by each individual, even without explicit discussion of coordination 
and even when the practices are inefficient or plain wrong (Meyer & Scott, 1992). 
The three explanations should exhibits marked empirical differences in measurements of 
participants’ pricing skills and overconfidence bias ex-ante and in the correlation of price 
discrepancy, i.e., the distance between the market price of an asset and the intrinsic value of that 
asset. Pricing discrepancies can be decomposed into dispersion and common components, which 
measure deviation from a common pricing method and correlation between discrepancies, 
respectively. If bubbles are caused by bounded rationality, then one can expect indication of 
inadequate pricing skills ex-ante and high dispersion component, where market prices fall 
randomly above or below the intrinsic values. If the Greater Fool explanation holds, one can 
expect evidence of widespread overconfidence bias. If bubbles are caused by institutionalization, 
the common discrepancy component should be high and price discrepancies should be correlated 
both among individuals and over time, as institutionalization spreads and settles. 
METHOD 
Following in the footsteps of institutional researchers (e.g. Elsbach, 1994; Lucas, 2003; 
Lucas & Lovaglia, 2006; Zucker, 1977) and numerous precedents in behavioral economics, we 
chose an experimental approach. We constructed a laboratory double auction market, which is 
known to possess characteristics of extreme economic efficiency or competitiveness (Holt, 
1995). The experimental market was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) 
and based on designs published in the economics literature (Dufwenberg et al., 2005; Smith et 
al., 1988). Taking a careful and rigorous approach, we created a conservative test of 
institutionalization by using a synthetic, high efficiency market coupled with little social 
interaction: participants could not communicate directly, had no shared history, and were 
guaranteed complete anonymity to avert any future consequences. Further, we did not use 
deception to initiate institutionalization (cf. Zucker, 1977). Rather, we expected it to appear in 
vivo, even though the experimental conditions eliminated conditions discussed in prior research 
in economics and sociology, such as market power, uncertainty, repeated interaction, identity and 
culture. 
We recruited 62 undergraduate students with no prior experience in such experiments for 
ten separate experimental sessions. At the experimental laboratory, participants received 
description of the experiment and information necessary for the calculation of asset values. After 
reviewing the information, the participants received a Price Questionnaire that probed their 
knowledge of a standard asset-pricing model. Then, the participants were asked to complete an 
 Assessment Questionnaire, which included questions designed to assess overconfidence. After 
completing the pre-trade questionnaires, the participants moved to a behavioral laboratory, where 
they sat in separate cubicles in front of networked personal computers and began trading. They 
were free to enter their minimum selling prices (ask) and/or their maximum offers to buy (bid). 
The participants knew that their earnings would be paid to them in cash at the end of the 
experiment. 
Each of the ten experimental sessions consisted of six participants who traded for 10 
periods lasting 120 seconds each. At the end of each period, a dividend of 20 cents per share was 
payable with a probability of 0.5. A summary screen appeared at the end of each period and 
presented individualized trading and divided results. At the conclusion of the trading periods, the 
participants received a $5 show-up fee and their earnings in cash. On average, payments were 
$13.38 (s.d.=2.87; range=$5.30-$18.30). 
RESULTS 
Similar to prior work, we observed bubbles in most of the experimental sessions. Figure 1 
illustrates the declared, intrinsic, and actual prices over trading periods, and shows how prices 
occasionally rose above the maximum present value (the sum of the highest possible dividends).  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of declared, intrinsic, and actual prices over trading periods 
Legend (left to right): average trading price; average present value (intrinsic value); maximum present value 
possible (intrinsic value); average declared value in the Price Questionnaire. 
 
Ex-ante pricing skills. We found no indication that bubbles were caused by lack of 
knowledge. Quite the contrary: participants had better understanding of the theoretical pricing 
model ex-ante, but – astonishingly – seem to have abandoned that understanding during trading. 
We used Haessel’s R2 (Haessel, 1978) to measure fit between the responses to the Price 
Questionnaire and intrinsic values and between the trading prices and intrinsic values. A 
 comparison of average prices declared in the Price Questionnaire with those obtained in actual 
trading revealed that the prices declared ex-ante were better fit to intrinsic values in nine out of 
10 sessions. Prices in trading also had higher normalized average price deviation in nine out of 
10 sessions and wider price amplitude in all of the sessions. 
Overconfidence bias. We found no indication of overconfidence bias. Participants 
generally viewed their own price assessment to be as precise as the others’. Measures of 
Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) show high reliability for each group of questionnaire items. 
Decomposition of price discrepancy. Importantly, we found that discrepancies between 
market prices and intrinsic values were increasingly correlated among participants over time. 
Decomposition of the average discrepancy between a given market price and the matching 
intrinsic value (Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, & van de Velden, 2005) shows that the common 
component played a major role in the discrepancies between market price and intrinsic values. It 
accounts for most of the variance in all sessions but one. Moreover, as Figure 2 demonstrates, the 
common component tends to increase during trading, showing that errors became more 
correlated as trading progressed. 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of common component in price discrepancy over trading periods 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results suggest that price bubbles were not simply the result of individual cognitive 
bias. We find that financial markets, even with textbook conditions of high efficiency, quickly 
develop patterns of behavior that are consistent with our predictions of institutionalization. We 
show that purely psychological explanations, such as bounded rationality and overconfidence, 
are insufficient to account for these patterns.  
Our findings problematize a tenet of neo-classical economics – that markets can be 
assumed to be efficient when certain characteristics are present: atomicity, product homogeneity, 
perfect information, equal access to technology and resources, free entry, and no regulation 
 (Hirschman, 1982). This presumption is central in public policy and is used to both justify 
regulation, as in anti-trust action, and advocate less government intervention, as in privatization. 
Even in sociological thought, which is generally indifferent about departure from market 
efficiency, it presumed that such departure will occur only under certain circumstances, such as 
the embeddedness of social and economic relations (which violates the atomicity assumption) 
(Uzzi, 1997). Our results, however, show that markets, even in an ideal state of presumed 
efficiency, may be more institutionalized than commonly thought. In fact, the findings here 
imply that institutionalization can happen even in extreme case of what Granovetter (1985) 
called undersocialized conditions.  
We do not doubt that markets can sometimes lead to efficient allocation of resources. 
However, if institutionalization appears so rapidly and settles so profoundly in a synthetic market 
designed for high efficiency, it seems reasonable to expect that even greater institutionalization 
will occur in real-world markets, financial or others, with their inherent uncertainty, lower 
efficiency, and direct communication between market participants. Thus, markets may be realms 
of coordinated action, much like organizations, further blurring the distinction between the two 
social structures.  
It is quite possible that institutions sometimes require long time or intensive interaction to 
develop, but our results provide additional support to Zucker’s finding that, given the right 
conditions, institutionalization can happen quickly and even with little social interaction. This 
suggests a clear distinction between institutions and culture: while the two may be intertwined, 
institutions are not always the proverbial stone shaped by water over time.  
A fruitful path would be to investigate how social interaction leads to institutionalization 
in markets and how it can be reversed. Recently, it was shown that in markets for cultural 
products, small initial differences can lead to dramatically different outcomes (Salganik, Dodds, 
& Watts, 2006). Additional work will be necessary to establish the conditions that induce 
institutionalization in markets, its magnitude, and how it might be reversed. 
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